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Risk and Capital Adjustment over the Business Cycle:  
Evidence from Indian Banks 
 
SAIBAL GHOSH 
 
Employing data on Indian banks for 1997-2006, we test the behavior of capital 
buffers over the business cycle. The evidence indicates that capital buffers exhibit 
pro-cyclical behavior,  
although the implied effects are small.  
 
1. Introduction 
The role of banks in the transmission process of monetary policy and the 
effect of bank capitalization in this transmission process has been discussed 
extensively (Kashyap and Stein, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000; Van den Heuvel, 
2003). In contrast, their role in transmitting GDP shocks has received limited 
attention. More specifically, inadequately capitalized banks facing materializing credit 
risk in a downturn basically have two options to avert the erosion of capital below 
minimum levels. First, they could raise capital. This is often easier said than done, 
because raising external capital could be costly and time-consuming (Cornett and 
Tehranian, 1994; Stein, 1998), while retaining earnings may not be a viable option 
owing to low returns. Second, banks can increase their capital buffer by reducing 
risk-weighted assets. However, bank-specific assets are often not marketable or 
alternately, their prices are depressed in downturns to the extent that their sale 
implies prohibitive losses. Consequently, a lowering of risk-weighted assets occurs 
through a cutback in lending. If such a cutback is stronger than indicated by declining 
loan demand, then the downturn could be further amplified.  
The empirical literature has taken two approaches in testing these 
hypotheses. The first has been to analyze the effects of banks’ capitalization on the 
transmission of business cycle fluctuations to lending. Studies adopting this 
approach find evidence that low-capitalized banks are forced to cut their loan supply 
in downturns (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Gambacorta and Misturelli, 2004). The 
second approach examines the effect of business cycle fluctuations on banks’ capital 
buffers (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004) and finds capital buffers exhibit counter-
cyclicality.  
Both approaches are not without their shortcomings, either. The first 
approach does not internalize the effects of business cycle fluctuations on banks’ 
capital buffers. In contrast, the second approach explicitly models banks’ capital 
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buffers. However, regressing banks’ capital buffers on the business cycle cannot 
distinguish between deliberate capital buffer building (i.e., supply-side effects) and 
demand-side effects working through loan demand.  
The present analysis exploits the second approach, but addresses the 
conceptual limitations. First, if one could demonstrate banks’ capitalization affects 
behavior of capital buffers, this would indicate the existence of supply-side effects. 
And second, beyond analyzing the effect of business cycle fluctuation on capital 
buffers, the analysis examines the drivers of the detected effects. In order to do so, 
capital buffer is decomposed into capital and risk-weighted assets and the effect of 
business cycle fluctuations on these components is analyzed. Since changes in risk-
weighted assets are correlated with lending, it seems likely that changes in risk 
weighted assets would manifest itself through changes in lending.  
The analysis proceeds as follows. We first outline the empirical model 
(Section 2) and the data and variables (Section 3). An analysis of the results follows 
thereafter (Section 4) followed by concluding remarks (Section 5).  
 
2. Empirical Model 
The banking literature suggests that banks have an incentive to build capital 
buffers as insurance against violation of the regulatory minimum capital requirements 
(Milne and Whalley, 2001). This incentive derives from two assumptions. First, banks 
cannot adjust their capital and risk instantaneously; otherwise, there would be no 
need for such buffers. Second, a violation of the stipulated capital ratios triggers 
costly supervisory actions, with negative implications for banks’ charter value. This 
trade-off between the cost of capital holding and the cost of failure determines the 
optimum capital buffer (Milne and Whalley, 2001).  
We weave these hypotheses together into a partial adjustment framework, 
where banks aim at holding their respective optimum capital buffer. Hence, the 
evolution of buffer (BUF) for bank i at time t is given by specification (1): 
BUF(i, t) - BUF(i, t-1) = a [BUF*(i, t) – BUF (i, t-1)]+u (i, t)                         (1) 
where the asterisk denotes optimal buffer, a is the speed of adjustment and u is the 
error term.  
The optimum buffer is not observable, but depends on the business cycle 
(CYCLE) due to its effect on credit risk and bank-specific variables (X), as suggested 
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by the banking literature (Ayuso et al., 2004; Alfon et al., 2004). Accordingly, the 
optimal capital buffer is given by (2):  
BUF*(i, t) = a(0) +a(1) CYCLE (t)+a(2) X(i, t)+e (i, t)                       (2) 
 Combining (1) and (2) and after re-arrangement yields specification (3):  
BUF (i, t) = g(0)+g(1) BUF (i, t-1)+g(2) CYCLE (t)+g(3) X(i, t)+ v(i,.t)       (3) 
where g(0) = a*a(0); g(1) = (1-a); g(2) = a*a(1); g(3) = a*a(3) and v = (a e +u). The 
specification (3) is akin to Estrella (2004) and Ayuso et al. (2004), wherein it is 
derived from an analytical framework wherein banks minimize costs of holding and 
adjusting capital.  
 The hypothesis in terms of coefficient g(2) can be postulated as follows: 
 
H1: g(2) >0 (resp., <0): The capital buffer fluctuates pro-cyclically (resp., counter-
cyclically) over the business cycle.  
  
Given the model as in (3), we employ dynamic panel data techniques.  
Accordingly, we report only the two-step system GMM estimates (Blundell and Bond, 
1998), which is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimates. However, 
to account for the fact that the two-step estimates tend to be downward biased, we 
employ the finite sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix derived by 
Windmeijer (2005).1 
  
3.  The data and variables 
 The data for the analysis are drawn from Statistical tables relating to banks in 
India, and Report on trend and progress of banking in India. Taken together, these 
two publications account for all of the bank-level variables employed in the analysis. 
The macro variables for the study come from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian 
economy (RBI, 2006). Table 1 provides a definition of the variables along with their 
summary statistics. 
 With respect to CYCLE, we use the real output gap, which isolates the 
business cycle from the economic trend. The CYCLE is computed by subtracting a 
non-linear trend from real GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.  However, the 
HP filter is often known to have a bad fit for the first and last observations. To 
circumvent this problem, we construct the filtered GDP time series on the basis of a 
longer GDP time series subsuming the sample period. In this fashion, the bad fit for 
the first and last years of the sample are eliminated from the analysis.  
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 The dependent variable is absolute capital buffer (BUF). Alternately, we also 
employ the standardized capital buffer (SBUF) to account for the fact that although 
two banks may have the same absolute capital buffer, their SBUF could differ if one 
bank’s absolute buffer is more volatile than the other. Accordingly, a bank with less 
volatile capital buffer would be better insured against possible violation of regulatory 
CRAR.  
 The bank-specific variables and their rationale can be summarized as under. 
As raising capital is costly, retained earnings are frequently employed to improve 
capital buffers. Accordingly, high-profit banks need to hold lower buffers (Milne and 
Whalley, 2001) which suggest that the expected relation between BUF and RoA 
could be negative. 
 Bank size may affect capital buffers through manifold channels. First, if there 
are economies of scale in screening and monitoring, large banks should hold 
relatively less capital. Second, large banks may have better investment and 
diversification opportunities. Thus, they are subject to lower probability of a large 
negative shock to their capital and need to hold a lower capital buffer. And finally, the 
‘too-big-to-fail’ hypothesis’ suggests that larger banks in financial distress are more 
likely to be bailed out, because of potential systemic effects. Taking into account 
these considerations, we include size effects with an expected negative sign.  
 Further, banks with high liquid asset (LIQUID) need less insurance against 
possible violation of minimum capital requirements, and are therefore, more likely to 
require lower capital buffer, indicating a negative sign on the variable. 
Finally, asset risk may have positive and negative impact on capital buffer. 
On the one hand, banks may have reacted to the implementation of the Basel 
Accord by increasing asset risk to compensate for having to hold more expensive 
capital (Koehn and Santomero, 1980), suggesting that portfolio risk exhibits a 
positive effect on capital buffers. On the other hand, banks may have reacted to the 
implementation of the Basel Accord by decreasing asset risk, as higher capital levels 
reduce incentives for risk-taking and higher levels of risk lower the incentive for 
decreasing capital (Furlong and Keeley, 1989). This behavior would be reflected in 
asset risk having a negative effect on banks’ capital buffers. To capture this aspect, 
we use NPL as a proxy for risk (since credit risk is the most important component of 
bank risk) with an unambiguous sign. We also include a dummy variable to capture 
 5
mergers as also to distinguish between different bank groups. Table 1 provides a 
definition of the variables and summary statistics.  
We start off with a sample of 60 banks comprising of state-owned, private 
(old and de novo) and foreign banks for the period 1997-2008. This comprises of 28 
state-owned, 5 de novo private, 16 old private and 11 foreign banks account for over 
four-fifths of banking assets. Taking on board the mergers and acquisitions, we have 
an unbalanced panel of banks, with a maximum of 720 bank-years.  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the sub-samples for banks with 
high and low capital buffers.2 It also contains the Wilcoxon rank sum test, which tests 
whether the sub-samples are from the same population.3 The test shows that, on 
average, least capitalized banks have higher levels of absolute and standardized 
capital buffers as also higher capital, although with higher variability.  
 
4. Regression analysis 
The results of the estimation are presented in table 3. With respect to 
CYCLE, the coefficient is positive and highly significant. This suggests that capital 
buffers exhibit pro-cyclical behavior. The implied effects are however, small: when 
real GDP increases by 1 percentage point, the capital buffer rise by 0.02 percentage 
points. Although the magnitude of the effect is in sync with the literature, the sign is 
contrary to the evidence obtaining for developed countries where buffers exhibit an 
observed counter-cyclicality.  
The findings with respect to other variables are also worth mentioning. The 
estimated coefficient on lagged capital buffer confirms the dynamic specification at 
the 0.01 level of significance. In effect, the magnitude of the coefficient on lagged 
absolute buffer equals 0.534, indicating that the coefficient of adjustment of actual 
buffer to the optimal one equals 0.45.4  
The estimated coefficient on RoA is significant and positive, implying that 
high profit banks hold high capital buffers. The estimated coefficient on SIZE is 
negative and highly significant, pointing to economies of scale, diversification effects 
and advantages in the access to capital. The estimated coefficient on LIQUID is 
significant and negative, consistent with a priori expectations. Finally, the coefficient 
on NPL is positive and significant, suggesting that banks with high credit risk hold 
higher buffers.  
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The results carry through when SBUF (instead of BUF) is the dependent 
variable. The variable CYCLE is positive and significant as earlier, indicating that the 
variability of buffers varies pro-cyclically with the business cycle. The control 
variables retain their sign and significance. 
In Cols.(3) and (4), we decompose the buffer into capital and risk-weighted 
assets, respectively. The results reveal that capital varies counter-cyclically, whereas 
risk-weighted assets fluctuate pro-cyclically; the magnitude of the latter is roughly 
twice as large as the one for capital. Taken together, the stronger pro-cyclical 
fluctuation of risk-weighted assets vis-à-vis the moderate counter-cyclical movement 
of capital could be the reason behind the pro-cyclical behavior of the capital buffer.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 The analysis examines the behavior of capital buffers over the business cycle 
and finds strong evidence of pro-cyclicality. A possible reason for such observed 
behavior can be traced to the stronger pro-cyclical behavior of risk-weighted assets 
as compared to capital.  
 These questions are relevant to the policy debate on the design of bank 
capital regulation. There has long been a concern that prudential capital 
requirements might exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of bank loan supply. During 
economic downturns, banks experience losses. An increased incidence of loan loss 
provisions during such periods might eat into their capital, making the bank capital 
requirements even more binding. Concurrently, given the uncertainty about the 
evolving macroeconomic environment and the prospects of any banking firm in 
particular, the cost of issuing equity to sustain lending during such periods could be 
prohibitively high. As a consequence, faced with the choice between issuing new 
capital and curtailing lending, banks may opt for the latter. The role of building up 
adequate capital buffers assumes relevance in such a situation.  
 
Endnotes 
The views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper reflects the author’s personal 
opinion.   
 
1. It is possible that the BUF series could contain a unit root, so that it would be preferable to 
work with changes (∆) instead of levels, as in (3). However, the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) unit 
root test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root for BUF, suggesting that our specification is 
appropriate.  
Variable Probability 
 7
BUF 0.000*** 
SBUF 0.000*** 
 
 
2. A bank is defined to have a low capital buffer if it is among the 5 per cent least capitalized 
for the respective year. Otherwise, it is defined as a bank with high capital buffer. 
 
3. Given that financial ratios are typically non-normally distributed, we employ this test which 
does not depend on the normality assumption. 
 
4.  See, for instance, equation (3) where g(1) = (1-a). Given g(1)=0.534 in specification (2), 
therefore a equals 0.466, which from equation (1) provides the speed of adjustment. 
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Table 1: Definition of bank-specific control variables 
Variable Empirical definition Obs. Mean Std.dev. 
BUF (Actual CRAR – regulatory minimum CRAR)/regulatory minimum CRAR* 530 0.453 0.441 
SBUF BUF/Stdev(Actual CRAR) 530 2.691 1.778 
CAP (Equity+reserves)/Total asset 530 0.077 0.048 
RISK Risk-weighted asset/Total asset 530 0.619 0.343 
RoA Net profit/Total asset 530 0.009 0.010 
SIZE Natural log of total asset 530 9.269 1.358 
LIQUID Cash in hand plus balances with central bank plus call money/Total asset 530 0.119 0.058 
NPL Non-performing loans/Total loans 530 0.087 0.058 
dy MERGER Unity for the acquirer bank in the year of the merger, else zero  530 0.019 0.136 
dy PSB Unity if bank is state-owned, else zero 530 0.472 0.499 
dy NPVT Unity if bank is new private, else zero 530 0.094 0.292 
dy OPVT Unity if bank is old private, else zero 530 0.226 0.419 
dy FB Unity if bank is foreign, else zero 530 0.208 0.406 
* Regulatory minimum CRAR was 8 per cent till 1999 and 9 per cent thereafter 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for control variables – by capitalization 
Variable 5 per cent lowest capitalized banks 95 per cent highest capitalized banks  
 Obs. Mean Std. dev Obs. Mean Std. dev Wilcoxon test 
BUF 503 0.473 0.444 27 0.084 0.046 8.271*** 
SBUF 503 2.809 1.746 27 0.499 0.419 7.582*** 
CAP 503 0.078 0.049 27 0.056 0.019 3.190*** 
RISK 503 0.618 0.349 27 0.637 0.219 -0.809 
RoA 503 0.009 0.010 27 0.008 0.009 0.816 
SIZE 503 9.301 1.378 27 8.683 1.244 2.225** 
LIQUID 503 0.119 0.059 27 0.132 0.052 -1.485 
NPL 503 0.087 0.056 27 0.102 0.093 -0.095 
dy MERGER 503 0.019 0.139 27 0.001 0.011 0.739 
 
Table 3: Blundell Bond estimates for the capital buffer 
Variable BUF SBUF CAP RISK 
 1 2 3 4 
BUF(t-1) 0.534 (0.013)***    
SBUF(t-1)  0.448 (0.132)***   
CAP (t-1)   0.436 (0.212)**  
RISK (t-1)    -0.509 (0.226)** 
CYCLE 0.015 (0.005)*** 0.111 (0.031)*** -0.101 (0.037)*** 0.213 (0.042)*** 
RoA 0.125 (0.019)*** 0.241 (0.117) 0.202 (0.031)*** 0.236 (0.033)*** 
SIZE -0.093 (0.027)*** -0.336 (0.137)*** -0.263 (0.129)** -0.237 (0.138)** 
LIQUID -0.074 (0.312) -0.563 (0.187)*** -0.077 (0.121) -0.084 (0.096) 
NPL 0.086 (0.524) 0.165 (0.032)*** 0.078 (0.027)*** 0.089 (0.033)*** 
dy MERGER -0.680 (0.093)*** 0.886 (1.073) -0.544 (0.136)*** -0.463 (0.212)** 
dy PSB -0.388 (0.186)** -1.082 (0.535)*** -0.409 (0.242)* -0.395 (0.213)* 
dy NPVT 0.126 (0.147) 1.002 (0.899) 0.135 (0.101) 0.140 (0.118) 
dy FB 0.234 (0.115)** 0.877 (0.529)*** 0.204 (0.142) 0.194 (0.127) 
Constant 0.742 (0.291)*** 1.507 (1.354) 0.863 (0.351)*** 0.737 (0.322)*** 
Observations 669 669 669 669 
Hansen test 0.129 0.126 0.139 0.145 
AR (1) test 0.071 0.107 0.089 0.079 
AR (2) test 0.176 0.365 0.209 0.212 
Standard errors within parentheses  
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
 
